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ABSTRACT
On a global scale, the estimated flow of migrant
workers’ remittances through formal channels
now comfortably exceeds $100bn per annum,
while the unrecorded flow through informal
channels amounts to at least as much again.
During the last few years the Informal Value
Transmission Systems (IVTS) networks
through which the latter are transferred have
attracted a great deal of attention, both because
of a gradual realisation of their scale, and
because of fears that they could provide a vehi-
cle for drug smugglers and terrorists to shift
funds without fear of detection by the authori-
ties. Recently reinforced anti-money laundering
(AML/CFT) regulations aimed at curbing
such illegitimate transfers are having an expen-
sive impact on all sections of the financial ser-
vices industry, no less in the formal than the
informal sector. As yet, however, remarkably
little attention has been paid to the basis on
which the so-called ‘underground’ networks in
the informal sector actually operate, the basis on
which they organise and guarantee the security
of their financial operations, let alone the extent
to which they may have developed their own
internal mechanisms for keeping drug smugglers
and terrorist financiers at bay. In the same vein
there is little awareness of the extent to which
these ‘informal’ networks now use sophisticated
communications technology, including Swift
and telegraphic transfer (TT), to implement
their transactions, and the extent to which the
financial liquidity generated by remittances now
plays a key role in supporting commercial coun-
ter-trade. Based on first-hand observations of the
activities of Anglo-Pakistani hawala networks,
this paper presents an empirically informed
account of the operation of IVTS as highly effi-
cient financial systems, and on this basis
explores whether recently reinforced AML/
CFT initiatives are fit for their purpose.
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INTRODUCTION
As everyone even remotely involved in the
global financial services sector is now well
aware, the new set of regulatory obliga-
tions aimed at curbing money laundering
with which compliance is now required is
having a significant impact on business
practices. Taking on new customers,
receiving funds from them, and even
implementing their existing customers’
instructions is now a far less straightfor-
ward task than it once was. A vastly reinvi-
gorated AML/CFT regime now requires
the identity of customers and the source of
any funds they may proffer to be checked
out far more extensively than straightfor-
ward commercial prudence has always
required. Not only must proof positive of
their customers’ identity and their business
activities now be obtained as a matter of
routine, but every organisation within the
sector has now acquired a new duty: to
monitor their customers’ financial activ-
ities, and to report all potentially suspicious
transactions reported to the authorities.
Failure to take adequate steps to comply
with these requirements can precipitate
sanctions of considerable severity — not
excluding the prospect of criminal prosecu-
tion. These requirements are currently
being rolled out on a global basis, and are
by no means solely restricted to banks:
insurance companies, accountants, lawyers,
stockbrokers, auction houses, estate agen-
cies and many others must now meet the
same requirements; recent estimates of the
total cost of compliance to these require-
ments in the USA alone could amount to
as much as $10.9bn per annum.1
While efforts to counter money laun-
dering — itself a markedly ill-defined
concept2 — can be traced back to the
days of prohibition, the current regulatory
framework is largely the product of the
activities of the Financial Crimes Enforce-
ment Network (FinCEN). This transna-
tional organisation was established by the
US Treasury in 1990, and its thinking
appears to have inspired most of the
financial provisions set out in the USA
Patriot Act, a measure passed into law at
great speed in the immediate aftermath of
the events of 9/11. While FinCEN’s initial
agenda was primarily directed at disrupt-
ing the activities of drug smugglers, the
USA Patriot Act had much broader con-
cerns. As its full title — Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism — makes abun-
dantly clear, terrorist finance no less than
drug smuggling is now the principal driv-
ing force behind the reinforced anti-
money laundering initiatives to which the
Act gave rise. Nor have these initiatives
been limited to the USA. Since the Act
came into force the US Government
placed the full weight of its diplomatic
resources behind efforts to persuade all
other countries to introduce similar regu-
latory regimes, while the Act’s provisions
giving the US authorities powers to
impound the US-based assets of any over-
seas institu-tion deemed to have fallen foul
of its expectations added further financial
muscle to the whole operation. Given the
dollar’s role as the global medium of
exchange, and New York’s role as the
ultimate financial hub for all such
exchanges, no serious player in the global
economic arena can now afford to ignore
the provisions of the Act.3
As result of its efforts to build a sanitis-
ing wall around the US dollar-based finan-
cial transactions, these provisions brought
an ill-understood sphere of global financial
activity — the informal ‘swap’ arrange-
ments which are commonly described as
‘underground banking’ — into much more
dramatic focus. Given that such arrange-
ments enabled huge financial deals to be
completed largely outwith the bounds of
the formally constituted financial sector,
and in such a way that they left no audit
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trails which could subsequently be sub-
jected to regulatory scrutiny, alarm bells
began to ring ever more loudly. If AML/
CFT regulations achieved their intended
goal within the formal sector, it followed
that these mysterious and entirely unregu-
lated underground banking networks
would become drug smugglers’ and terror-
ists’ financial vehicle of choice — always
supposing that was not already the case.
Nor did such a prospect appear to be
merely hypothetical. As readers promptly
began to be reminded in sensationalist arti-
cles in the press, innumerable unlicensed
and unregistered store-front operators ser-
ving Muslim communities in North Amer-
ica and Western Europe were busy sending
huge sums to all manner of exotic destina-
tions in Asia and the Middle East through
a shadowy money-transmission system
known as hawala. In the paranoid atmo-
sphere which grew up in the aftermath of
9/11, little additional imagination was
required to join up the dots, and to reach
the conclusion that these largely Muslim
controlled hawala networks — together
with a number of other similarly structured
Informal Value Transmission Systems
(IVTS) used by migrant communities of
differing origins — were vehicles for
money laundering on a global scale. IVTS
networks rapidly became the prime target
of renewed efforts to intercept and obstruct
the activities of terrorists and drug smug-
glers.
FinCEN was well aware of the existence
of such networks prior to the passage of
the Patriot Act. Since its objective was to
subject all forms of financial activity —
whether implemented in the formal or the
informal sector — to regulatory scrutiny,
the newly reinforced AML/CFT regime
was also designed in such a way as to apply
with equal force in both contexts. The
objectives of those who designed the new
regime appear to have been three-fold:
first, to place ever larger obstacles in the
way of money launderers seeking to pro-
cess their funds, no less in the informal
than the formal sector; secondly, to pro-
vide financial regulators in every country
in the world with the wherewithal to place
sanctions on, and ultimately to prosecute,
any financial operators who had failed to
conform to their model regulatory require-
ments; and thirdly (despite many public
denials), to establish an environment in
which IVTS procedures would rapidly be
shorn of their remaining advantages and
attractions, so much so that all the legiti-
mate business which such systems had
hitherto handled would progressively
migrate into a properly regulated and audi-
table formal sector.
Set against that background the central
objective in this paper is to explore an issue
which has as yet attracted remarkably little
analytical attention: the way in which
IVTS networks in general — and hawala
networks in particular — actually operate
as transnational value transfer systems, and
in doing so suggest that the secret of their
financial success derives from their capacity
to operate as self-regulating coalitions clo-
sely akin to those described by Greif in his
well-known study of Maghribi traders.4
This in turn provides a platform from
which to consider a number of further
related issues, including:
— the place which IVTS/hawala networks
currently occupy in the global financial
order;
— the vulnerability of such networks to
infiltration by criminal elements;
— the degree to which established patterns
of self-regulation with such networks
have kept such elements at bay;
— whether recent AML/CFT initiatives
have reinforced — or merely by-passed
— those self-regulatory structures;
— to review the effectiveness of the new




THE INFORMAL FINANCIAL SECTOR
The most obvious way in which transac-
tions within the informal sector differ from
those executed in the formal sector is the
extent to which the former are underwrit-
ten by relationships of interpersonal trust
rather than by impersonal bureaucratic
procedures. As a result, day-to-day finan-
cial activity produces a substantially lower
volume of documentation generated
within the formal sector. Even though an
ever-growing proportion of financial trans-
actions are now executed electronically,
paper records have by no means been
superseded. Indeed precisely because of the
ephemeral character of the Ethernet, all the
parties to any given transaction normally
take care to store a physical record of their
activities, with the result that data archives
continue to follow a pattern of exponential
growth. It is not hard to see why: these
archives provide both internal and external
auditors with an opportunity to construct a
comprehensive audit trail for each and
every transaction should they so wish; and
that capacity provides every institution
with its ultimate bastion against financial
malfeasance, no less with respect to transac-
tions with external customers than to its
own internal operations. Any transaction
implemented in such a way as to evade
these archiving procedures — whether
described as ‘cash in hand’, ‘under the
counter’, ‘outside the books’ or ‘off-balance
sheet’ — is an immediate source of suspi-
cion. At their mildest errant transactions
may be the outcome of efforts to evade
regulatory restrictions and/or the payment
of taxes; at the other end of the spectrum
they point to the prospect of outright
criminal malfeasance. The maintenance of
comprehensive financial archives may be
an expensive procedure, but given their
role in ensuring the integrity of the entire
financial order, investment in record-keep-
ing is consequently regarded as a necessary
cost of doing business.
Migrants and remittances
Given such expectations, the realisation
that a large proportion of the world’s ever-
growing stock of long-distance labour
migrants regularly eschew the services of
the formally constituted international
banking system to transmit their savings
back to their kinsfolk, preferring to use
informal IVTS networks instead can come
as a jolt, especially since the volume of
funds so transferred is anything but trivial.
In the 2005 edition of ‘World Economic
Outlook’, the IMF sets out calculations
(based largely on national Balance of Pay-
ments (BoP) data) which suggest that the
flow of workers’ remittances to developing
countries through formal channels alone
currently amounts to at least $100bn per
annum. The parallel flow of remittances
through informal channels by definition
eludes these published BoP statistics, which
IMF staff readily admit may well signifi-
cantly underestimate the true scale of trans-
fers through formal channels; furthermore,
a reasonable guesstimate of the scale of
transfers through informal channels is that
they amount to at least as much again, and
possibly a good deal more besides.5
The reasons why migrant workers fre-
quently prefer to use informal channels are
quite straightforward. Operating out of
store-front premises located conveniently
close to the localities in which their custo-
mers live and work, money-transmission
agents provide a service which mainline
banks have found it quite impossible to
match. Besides offering extremely favour-
able exchange rates and low commission
charges, most operators guarantee cash
delivery into the hands of designated reci-
pients within the space of 48 hours, no
matter how remote the destination may
be.6 No wonder customers eagerly flock to
their doors.
Since 9/11, however, these operations
have become an endangered species. In the
immediate aftermath of the attack on the
Page 322
Coalitions of reciprocity
twin towers the al-Barakaat network, one
of the largest hawala networks serving
emigrants from Somalia, was closed down
on the grounds that its services had been
utilised to finance terrorism.7 As shall be
seen later, a number of hawala operators in
the UK have also faced charges of money-
laundering, while in May 2005 the US
Immigration and Customs and Enforce-
ment Service proudly announced that since
the Patriot Act was enacted ‘a nationwide
campaign against unlicensed money trans-
mittal businesses and underground hawalas
had resulted in the arrest of 140 individuals,
138 criminal indictments, and the seizure of
more than $25.5 million in illicit pro-
ceeds’.8
What is far from clear, however, is
whether any of these foreclosures — almost
all of which came about as a result of
breaches of regulatory requirements —
were actually on target, at least with respect
to the formal objectives of the Patriot Act.
No one would contest that there is an
urgent need to curb the activities of inter-
national terrorists and drug smugglers, or
that coherent efforts to provide this multi-
billion dollar sector of the global foreign
exchange market with an appropriate regu-
latory framework is now a priority. When
politically driven demands for instant
‘results’ dominate the agenda, however, the
temptation to cut corners can become over-
powering. If these two quite separate objec-
tives are comprehensively inter-woven —
as this author would suggest has occurred
in the aftermath of the events of 9/11 —
the consequences can be disastrous. First,
the pursuit of regulatory breaches can
become a surrogate for catching terrorists
or drug smugglers red-handed.9 Secondly,
and yet more seriously still, while the pro-
spect of successfully prosecuting surrogates
is undoubtedly increased if regulatory
regimes are constructed with little or no
awareness of just how the financial systems
they are designed to oversee actually oper-
ate, institution of legal proceedings based
on such surrogate offences makes it next to
impossible to determine whether the defen-
dant was actively engaged in criminal mal-
feasance, or whether his preferred methods
of business practices were based on princi-
ples with which the regulators were unfa-
miliar. This precipitates yet more
counterproductive consequences. Once the
stable door rather than the occupant of the
stall behind it becomes the target, all traces
of the fleeing horse — let alone of its pro-
venance — will normally have been oblit-
erated long before prosecutions reach court.
As shall be seen, triumphs so achieved are
frequently nugatory.
Just what were the regulators seeking
to regulate?
Prior to the passage of the Patriot Act, the
only extended empirical study of the actual
operation of IVTS networks was carried
out by Nikos Passas on behalf of the Dutch
Ministry of Justice.10 But despite having
been briefed to explore the extent to which
IVTS networks were being used as vehicles
for money laundering, Passas’s conclusions
were strikingly cautious:
‘The material reviewed for this study
suggests that IVTS do not represent a
money laundering or crime threat in ways
different from conventional banking or other
legitimate institutions. While criminal
entrepreneurs do make use of IVTS, it
appears that the amounts involved represent
a rather small part of the dirty money in
circulation. The growth of IVTS for hard
core criminal purposes is limited by the
wide availability of numerous other
alternatives . . . This does not mean that
sophisticated criminals cannot adopt
IVTS methods to transfers funds among
legitimate or shell companies around the
world. However, the traditional IVTS
seem to be used primarily by ethnic
groups either for perfectly legitimate
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purposes or for the commission of
relatively minor offences, such as evasion
of taxes and currency controls. . . . There
is little evidence that the most sophisticated
and organized criminals make use of IVTS.’
[italics added]11
Nevertheless in the aftermath of 9/11
remarkably little attention was paid to
arguments of this kind. Even when Passas
reached the conclusion that there was no
evidence that such networks were either
more open to, or more frequently used as,
a vehicle for criminal activity than more
conventionally organised financial institu-
tions, while there was plentiful data indi-
cating that they had entirely legitimate
foundations as a cheap and effective vehicle
for the transfer of migrant remittances, the
tide was already flowing in the opposite
direction. As Passas himself noted, erro-
neous statements about IVTS were being
uncritically reproduced in government
reports, academic publications, and even
UN documents, so much so that a great
deal of what passed for knowledge in this
sphere was best regarded as little more than
the outcome of the creation of ‘facts by
repetition’. Little did he know how right
he was. Despite the publication of a
number of reports following aspects of his
ground-breaking study,12 empirically
grounded information on the day-to-day
operation of IVTS networks remain extre-
mely sparse. Meanwhile efforts to comply
with the requirements of AML/CFT have
turned the manufacture of ‘facts by repeti-
tion’ into what can only be described as a
global industry.13
THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF
CONTEMPORARY HAWALA/IVTS
NETWORKS
In the light of glaring post 9/11 headlines
suggesting that IVTS networks threatened
the very foundations of the established
socio-political order, it is worth remember-
ing that the dramatic increases in the scale
of value transfers through such networks
during the closing decades of the twentieth
century can be traced to much more mun-
dane sources. As a result of rapid economic
growth in Euro-America — as well as in
the oil-rich areas around the Gulf, and
more recently still around the East Asian
sector of the Pacific Rim — ever-greater
levels of affluence have led local residents
to retreat en masse from unattractive jobs at
the menial end of the labour market. As a
result an ever-growing number of migrant
workers — most of whom originate from
relatively poverty stricken rural areas else-
where in Asia, North Africa and Latin
America — have made their way north
and west to fill the gaps in local labour
markets. Now tens of millions strong,
migrants of non-European origin now
make up a significant component of the
urban labour force in most parts of the
developed world. Like their counterparts
of European origin who settled in the New
World a century ago,14 most remain in as
close, if not closer, touch with their family
and kinsfolk back home, to whom they
remit a significant proportion of their
wages. Given that most are employed as
unskilled labourers, their earnings are rela-
tively meagre, especially in the early years
of settlement. Hence they are rarely in a
position to send more than a few hundred
dollars a month back home to support
their families. But while the size of each
such remittance is relatively small, the
number of remitters is large: hence the
huge scale of the global transfer market
noted earlier. Nevertheless organising the
reliable delivery of these remittances to
often obscure destinations is an extremely
logistical task.
Relatively few migrants’ families have
easy access to the formal banking system,
especially if they live in rural areas. More-
over as migrants soon discovered, sending
small sums through formally constituted
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banks, as well as specialist services such as
Western Union, does not come cheap: for
small sums, commissions are never less than
10 per cent, and often considerably more;
exchange range spreads are normally sub-
stantial; transmission speeds can frequently
be excruciatingly slow, especially if the
transaction is passed through the cumber-
some bureaucratic procedures so often still
maintained by state-owned banks in the
developing world; and even if funds can be
transferred to an accessible location, the
social status of the recipient is often so low
that the funds themselves can be difficult to
extract. It was in these circumstances that
informal transfer mechanisms came into
their own. Organised by members of the
migrants’ own communities, and untram-
melled by the expense and necessary delays
precipitated by formal bureaucratic proce-
dures, hawaladars contrived to arrange the
swift, reliable and low-cost delivery of
remittances directly into the hands of reci-
pients, no matter how remote their place
of residence. Scoring hugely in terms of
speed, reliability, cost and convenience,
informal systems enjoyed a position of
very substantial advantage over the compe-
titors in the formal sector.15 No wonder
they became migrants’ transfer vehicle of
choice.
None of these networks sprang into exis-
tence out of the blue: each was grounded
in a specific group of migrants’ ancestral
values and traditions, and in modes of
exchange and value transfer which usually
had lengthy historical roots. In the case of
hawala, these lay in the commercial bank-
ing operations devised by merchants
engaged in long-distance trade in and
around the Indian Ocean region in the pre-
colonial period. These networks are extre-
mely ancient. Archaeological excavations
have uncovered quays and harbours sup-
porting trade between the Indus delta and
Mesopotamia as long ago as 2000 BCE. By
Roman times the deep-sea route between
the Red Sea and Southern India — a
voyage which took advantage of the
annual shift in the prevailing winds asso-
ciated with the monsoons — was in regular
use.16 When Roman dominance in the
Mediterranean region was replaced by that
of the Arabs, the scale of trade in and
around the Indian Ocean expanded enor-
mously. So, too, did the presence of Islam
throughout the region, since the majority
of those involved in long-distance trade
were — or became — Muslims. It was pre-
cisely such traders who initially established
local Islamic bridgeheads in India, along
the coast of East Africa, in Malaysia and
Indonesia, as well as in numerous Chinese
ports; since hawala (understood as ‘the
transfer of debt’17) was by then the usual
means whereby Muslim merchants operat-
ing out of the Red Sea financed long-dis-
tance trade, they took the system with
them as their networks spread out across
the Indian Ocean.18
Given the ever-growing scale and com-
plexity of long-distance traders’ activities,
one of their most pressing financial needs
was some means of facilitating value-trans-
fers between the various ports and markets
in which they did business. In their
absence traders would be faced with the
expensive — and dangerous — burden of
transporting large sums of bullion over
long distances. Hence hawala initially
emerged as a secure and effective means
whereby long-distance traders could
finance their activities. The growth and
development of contemporary hawala net-
works is best understood in the context of
an appreciation of how these ancient sys-
tems operated.
The role of hundi in hawala transactions
Hawala networks initially emerged in a
context which was very different from that
with which we are familiar today. Com-
munications were dramatically slower,
external enforcement mechanisms were
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largely absent, and principals — especially
those engaged in organising long-distance
value-transmission — rarely had an oppor-
tunity to meet one another face to face:
indeed they might well never do so at all. It
is also worth identifying the specific charac-
ter of the transactions for which they were
responsible. Although hawala (whether in
its ancient or its contemporary modern
format) is regularly described as a ‘banking’
system, hawaladars were (and are) in no
sense money-lenders or deposit-takers. No
interest was charged on debts or expected
on deposits: while the principle of interest
was well known, money-lenders formed
another speciality altogether.19 With this in
mind hawaladars (ie those who facilitate
hawala exchanges) can best be identified as
specialist value transmission agents utilising
a network of reciprocities with partners like
themselves to facilitate value transfer on
their clients’ behalf as between spatially
separated financial arenas.20
From this perspective hawala can also be
regarded as a specific instance of a more
general class of Informal Value Transfer
operations, in which the notion of a ‘trans-
fer of debt’ (the original Arabic root mean-
ing of the term hawala) provides a means
of financing long-distance trade in a
manner congruent with the prescriptions
of classical Islamic law. Within that context
the key financial instrument by means of
which hawaladars serviced their customers’
needs was the hundi: effectively a bill of
exchange.21 Using instruments of this kind,
a trader could deposit his working capital
with a hawaladar operating out of his
home base, in exchange for a hundi which
was negotiable either in whole or in part
from the issuing hawaladar’s corresponding
partners in a range of distant markets; and
once his business was done in any given
market he could translate his profits into a
similar instrument issued by a local hawala-
dar, ready for use either in the next trading
centre to which he moved, or simply to be
encashed as profit once he finally returned
to his home base.
Hawaladars who issued such hundis
appear to have used all the well-established
procedures of commercial banking. In
major Indian Ocean ports such as Hormuz,
Surat or Malacca where long-distance trade
was extensive, each hawaladar might well
find himself issuing and encashing dozens
of hundis every day: and so long as each
operator could engineer his business in such
a way that daily inflows and outflows of
specie were broadly equivalent, a relatively
small commission on each transaction
could be the basis of a very profitable busi-
ness. Of course some of the hundis issued in
this way might well be used to facilitate
deals between traders operating in the
immediate vicinity of the port, and would
therefore return straight to the issuer for
encashment. By far the largest and most
significant transactions underwritten by
hawaladars, however, were those con-
tracted by long-distance traders arriving
from, or setting off to, markets located
many hundreds of miles away. Hence
hawaladars engaged in the issue of hundis
were anything but stand-alone operators:
each formed a node in a network of corre-
sponding partners based in major trading
centres spread across a large geographical
region, within which all were prepared to
honour each others’ financial instruments.
In the vocabulary of contemporary com-
puting such networks can usefully be
described as secure distributed systems, and
in that of games theory as coalitions.
From the customer’s perspective, a hundi
is best understood as a straightforward pro-
missory note which is encashable on pre-
sentation to any one of the system’s many
spatially scattered front offices: in practice,
a well-known hawaladar, or failing that his
agent, sitting right there in the middle of
the marketplace. In back-office terms,
however, the execution of each such hundi
added yet further to a pre-existing standing
Page 326
Coalitions of reciprocity
relationship of debt (or credit) as between
himself and whoever issued the instrument
in the first place. In the absence of any
external means of enforcing any aspect of
these transactions, trust was a necessary
prerequisite for the reliable operation of
the whole system. Not only did each cus-
tomer need to be confident that his hundi
would promptly be honoured by any of
the issuer’s partners to whom he presented
it, but each distant encasher needed to have
an equal degree of confidence that any dis-
bursement made would be settled in due
course. This was crucial: in the absence of a
robust and effective means of guaranteeing
settlement, the whole system would
rapidly have collapsed.
Hawala as a vehicle for settlement
How, then, was this avoided? Within such
a multi-nodal value transmission network,
each participating hawaladar stood in a
constantly shifting position of debit or
credit with respect to those operating at
each of the other nodes of the network.
Moreover, during seasons when the winds
were adverse and trade was poor, inter-
nodal debts could grow extremely large. In
these circumstances the central challenge
was to establish a reliable means of securing
and settling such debts, even though the
only means of communication was via the
uncertain progress of camel caravans and
sailing ships. The construction of networks
of absolute mutual trust was the obvious
answer: once such a network was in place
every hawaladar could be confident of ulti-
mate settlement no matter how great the
cumulative debt he temporarily found
himself carrying. That said, the scale and
complexity of the Indian Ocean’s trading
systems, together with the extent to which
these formed a single financial universe,
rendered the prospect of arranging such
debt-settlements without undue delay a
good deal brighter than one might sup-
pose. If exchanges along any given trade
route were broadly in balance, it followed
that in the short to medium term debts
running in opposite directions could routi-
nely be struck off against each other — so
much so that the net transfer required to
settle the imbalance between any two
nodes would invariably be very much
smaller than the gross value of the transfers
between them. Multi-nodal settlements
were inevitably more complex, but the
same principles still applied.
Just as with any clearing bank, the pro-
cess of issuing and honouring hundis on
behalf of retail customers was a relatively
trivial task as compared with the imple-
mentation of a system of settlement
through which a complex web of debts
could be settled on a reliable basis. More-
over, in this case settlements had to be
achieved in a context where communica-
tions travelled at the speed of the fastest
ship or camel, and in the absence of any
coordinating headquarters — let alone an
external agency — through which to
resolve disputes or enforce agreements.
Strategies for underwriting the security
of settlement
Regardless of whether the context in ques-
tion is modern or premodern, two key
conditions must hold if such commercial
settlements are to be reliably completed.
First, every participant must be confident
that all potential business partners will rou-
tinely fulfil all bargains, and secondly they
must also have access to effective sanctions
should anyone fail to do so. It is precisely
in order to fulfil these conditions that con-
temporary banking systems operate within
the context of a complex mesh of nation-
ally and internationally enforced legal and
regulatory frameworks, and subject their
operations to regular audits, both internal
and external. The object of doing so is
two-fold. First to underpin the stability
and security of the financial system as a
whole, and secondly to assure their custo-
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mers that their assets have not been and
will not be mislaid. Contemporary IVTS
networks arouse suspicion because they
appear to have no way of fulfilling these
conditions, and consequently to be wide
open to malfeasance.
How far are these conclusions justified?
In addressing that question it is worth
remembering — as has just been seen —
that bankers, traders and value transmission
agents in the premodern period faced just
the same challenges as their contemporary
counterparts, but nevertheless managed to
construct a tolerably secure — but largely
non-bureaucratic — financial order within
which to conduct their business. How,
then, did they achieve this outcome, given
that even the most fervently committed
Muslims readily acknowledged that it was
hopelessly idealistic to assume that fear of
divine punishment would be a sufficient
bastion against cheating? Ethnographic
observation of practices in the present and
the recent past all point in the same direc-
tion. Eschewing the contemporary Euro-
American assumption that all transactors
are best advised to treat each other as if
they were unreliable and hence potentially
malfeasant ‘strangers’, the premodern ten-
dency was to assume that all such transac-
tions should have a social as well as a
financial dimension, and hence that they
would normally be conducted within the
context of a set of long-term reciprocal
understandings between those involved.
In these circumstances long-distance tra-
ders, and above all those who provided the
financial infrastructures which grew up to
support their activities, ordered their busi-
ness on the very inverse of the assumption
that they and their customers were a bunch
of mutually distrustful strangers. Instead,
they formed a series of tightly knit net-
works, within each of which all partici-
pants stood in a position of absolute trust
with respect to one another. The resulting
relationships of reciprocity were by no
means confined to the sphere of business
activity: rather they extended into — and
indeed were underpinned by — a multi-
dimensional web of interpersonal reciproci-
ties, such that all those involved in the net-
work were bound together into a self-
sustaining and self-ordering community.
This also gave rise to a highly effective
sanction for malfeasance: excommunication
of the offender and all his kinsfolk. In a
world of tight-knit communities, excom-
munication was synonymous with social
death.
Communities constructed on this basis
lend themselves to trans-local extension,
since both the patterns of reciprocity which
underpin them and the sanctions which
guaranteed them, can readily be sustained
even in the absence of daily face-to-face
contact between participants. Hence pre-
modern trading networks were for the
most part composed of people with distinc-
tive linguistic and religious commitments
whose pursuit of trade had led them to
form wide-ranging diasporas, whose inter-
nal coherence was continuously reinforced
by trans-local ties of kinship and marriage,
and very often by sectarian religious com-
mitments as well.22
The dialectics of trust in trans-local
commercial networks
In seeking to comprehend the effectiveness
of network-grounded reciprocity as a
means of sustaining system security, obser-
vations of contemporary practice can use-
fully be set alongside the findings of
economic historians. The concerns of the
latter were precisely the same as those
which confront us here: how were disputes
settled, and malfeasance curbed prior to the
emergence of state-enforced regulatory
and/or legal structures? In this respect
Greif’s well-known study of the activities
of 11th-century Arab/Jewish traders in the
Maghrib is of particular interest, not least
because he analyses practices in the same
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geographical and cultural milieu as that
from which hawala emerged. His conclu-
sions are worth quoting at length:
‘The Maghribi traders overcame the
contractual problems associated with
agency relationships . . . through a non-
anonymous organizational framework,
the coalition. Within the coalition an
internal information-transmission system
served to balance asymmetric informa-
tion and a reputation mechanism was
used to ensure proper conduct. This
reputation mechanism explains the
observed ‘‘trust’’ relations among the
traders. The ‘‘trust’’ did not reflect a
social control system or the internaliza-
tion of norms of behaviour (although
these factors play a role in any economic
system). Rather, the Maghribi traders
established a relationship between past
conduct and future economic reward. As
a result, agents resisted the short-term
gains attainable through deception, since
the reduction in future utility resulting
from dishonest behaviour outweighed
the associated increase in present utility.
Since this fact was known beforehand to
all traders, agents could acquire a reputa-
tion as honest agents . . .
The common religious-ethnic origin
of the traders provided the natural
boundaries for the coalition and served
as a signal where information regarding
past conduct could be obtained, while
the commercial and social ties within the
coalition served as a network for the
transmission of information. The infor-
mation-transmission mechanism gener-
ated by the social structure — the
Maghribi traders group — supported the
operation of an economic institution —
the coalition. On the other hand, this
economic institution, which promoted
organizing agency relations only among
members of this social structure,
motivated the Maghribi traders to
interact and thus to preserve their social
structure, their distinct identity within
the Jewish world.’23
As Greif has gone on to argue, his analysis
is also capable of generalisation to all
manner of other trust-based commercial
coalitions,24 including Indian Ocean hawala
networks in both their ancient or modern
formats, and in principle most other con-
temporary IVTS initiatives as well. But if
this is indeed the case, are such coalitions
merely a discrepant mediaeval hangover
whose contemporary vitality existence is
primarily dependent on their capacity to
support criminal malfeasance? Or are they,
on the contrary, a rational and creative
response to some specific commercial chal-
lenges, and their trust-based modus operandi
is precisely the reason why they frequently
enjoy a position of competitive advantage
over more bureaucratically constituted
operations?
THE ECLIPSE AND REVIVAL OF
HAWALA NETWORKS
When European adventurers initially broke
into Indian Ocean trading systems in the
16th century, they had little alternative but
to make extensive use of locally constituted
financial services, if only because extant
commercial networks in the region were a
great deal more sophisticated than their
own;25 and for straightforward commercial
reasons, European merchants and adminis-
trators operating in more peripheral areas
continued to make use of such local value
transmission systems until well into the
19th century.26 By then, however, Eur-
opean domination had become a great deal
more extensive, such that European-style
financial institutions occupied the com-
manding heights in all the Indian Ocean’s
major trading centres. In consequence,
indigenously ordered financial services
found themselves pressed outwards towards
the geographical and economic periphery
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of the imperial economy, where the pick-
ings were too slight to be of much interest
to European-owned banks and trading
houses.
While virtually all newly independent
postcolonial states inherited a plural finan-
cial system, in the sense that Western-style
financial systems stood at the core while
more traditional structures still flourished
at the periphery,27 most promptly took
active steps to yet further extend the reach
of the formal sector, often in a nationalised
format, at the expense of more informal
practices: influential theories of progress
and modernisation held that they could do
no less. Yet despite consistent efforts to
eliminate the informal sector throughout
the developing world, it has continued to
thrive — and nowhere more spectacularly
so than in transnational contexts. Four key
developments have facilitated this process
of resurgence. They include:
— the imposition of over-tight exchange
controls by many newly independent
postcolonial states, with the consequent
emergence of ‘black’ markets in foreign
exchange;
— the huge outflow of labour-migrants to
the Gulf and Euro-America, and a
consequent massive return flow of
migrant remittances;
— the rapid growth of manufacturing
activity in East and South East Asia
leading to an upsurge in intra-regional
trade in manufactured goods;
— radical improvements in communica-
tions technology, including fax,
internet, cell- and satellite phones.
Taken together, these developments gave
rise to an arena within which hawala net-
works rapidly gained a new lease of life:
not only did migrant remittances provide
an ever-expanding source of hard-currency
liquidity, but the institutionally blocked
demand for foreign exchange among com-
mercial enterprises in labour-exporting
countries provided a ready counter-flow of
value against which to broker settlements.
Moreover, as far as migrants from postco-
lonial states were concerned, the attractive-
ness of the informal sector was further
reinforced by the sclerotic character of the
banking sector in their countries of origin,
such that the provision of financial services
in rural areas was invariably extremely
poor. Meanwhile the hawaladars’ rapid uti-
lisation of improvements in communica-
tions technology enabled them to run their
‘informal’ systems in an ever more sophisti-
cated way, so much so that they have been
able to gain a position of substantial com-
petitive advantage over institutions operat-
ing within the formal sector.
How do contemporary hawala/IVTS
systems actually work?
Contemporary hawala networks, like other
similarly structured IVTS operations,
derive a large part of their success from
their exploitation of a specific niche in the
forex market: the transfer of value between
different currency regimes on behalf of
small-scale customers. The key to their suc-
cess in this sphere has been two-fold. First,
the construction of highly efficient struc-
tures through which to collect, consolidate,
transfer, deconsolidate and finally to distri-
bute large numbers of relatively small
packets of value — enabling them to deal
very effectively with first mile/last mile
problems. Secondly, by redoubling the
commercial efficiency of the whole opera-
tion by brokering parallel transfers in the
reverse direction, enabling settlement to be
implemented on an in-house — or to be
more precise on a within-the-network —
basis.
Contemporary counter-transfers are very
different in character from the multiplicity
of penny-packets characteristically dis-
patched by migrant workers. Besides being
made up of very much larger tranches of
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value, such transfers also take place for
quite different purposes. At present most
appear to be derived from three key
sources. First, from commercial enterprises
settling invoices for goods imported from
overseas suppliers; secondly, from members
of affluent local elites financing the pur-
chase of health care, educational services
and so forth overseas; and thirdly, from
such institutions and persons taking the
opportunity to tuck away financial assets in
safe havens overseas.
Implementing the transfer and delivery
of these differently structured streams of
value — let alone completing the necessary
processes of settlement — is a daunting
logistical challenge.28 The way in which
this is achieved is most illuminating. Con-
temporary remittance-driven hawala
operations appear to have three core ele-
ments, all of which are closely inter-con-
nected. They include:
1. Information processing
— provision of current exchange rates
to prospective senders;
— collection of data from senders
about how much is to be delivered
in what currency, where and to
whom;
— transmission of delivery data to the
remote destination.
2. Value transmission and settlement
— provision of credit at the point of
delivery, since delivery invariably
precedes settlement;
— identification of soft-currency funds
with which to make that settlement;
— brokering the necessary transnational
and cross-currency settlements.
3. Collection and delivery of currency notes
— collection and consolidation of
senders’ deposits, and the onward
transmission of these funds to settle-
ment partners;
— deconsolidation of credits received
from settlement partners, and their
distribution to assigned recipients at
a variety of overseas destinations.
In this schema hundis have largely disap-
peared from the picture: improvements in
communications technology have rendered
them largely redundant as vehicles for the
implementation of this form of value trans-
mission. Other aspects of the hawala
system, however, remain as important as
ever, as a concrete example of contempor-
ary practice will serve to demonstrate.
A concrete example: The transfer of
remittances from the UK to Pakistan’s
Mirpur District
Rather more than a third of a million
people whose ancestral origins lie in the
Mirpur District are resident in the UK,
most of whom keep in close touch with
their kinsfolk back home.29 Not only are
visits back and forth extremely frequent
(PIA operates no less than ten flights into
Manchester every week), but many of the
pioneer settlers who arrived in the UK 40
years ago have now retired, and are now
taking the opportunity to use their accumu-
lated savings to build splendid new houses
for themselves back in Mirpur. As a result
remittances from the UK to Mirpur are
currently running at somewhere in the
region of £250m per annum, the greater
part of which passes through hawala net-
works. In doing so delivery is routinely
achieved within 48 hours, with no signifi-
cant organisational fuss and 100 per cent
reliability. From the customer’s perspective,
sending money back to Mirpur could
hardly be more straightforward. All they
have to do is approach their local Pakistani
travel agent (the vast majority of whom
offer such services, either in their own right,
or as the agent of a larger hawala operator
based in a city with a large local Pakistani
population), enquire about and agree upon
a rate of exchange, make the agreed pay-
ment, and provide the hawaladar with the
Page 331
Ballard
recipient’s name and address in Mirpur:
within 48 hours the sum agreed upon will
be ready for collection in Mirpur.30
So how is it all achieved? As ever the
back-office mechanisms which support
these apparently straightforward front-
office results are extremely complex. As a
result they are best considered in a series of
stages, all of which have to fit smoothly
together to produce the desired result.
Step 1: The collection of sterling in the
UK and the delivery of rupees in Mirpur
In front-office terms, hawaladars engaged in
collecting and dispatching remittance trans-
fers work in close collaboration with corre-
sponding partners operating at the
destination(s) to which those remittances
are dispatched. Leaving the issue of settle-
ment to one side for the moment, imple-
menting that component of the deal which
matters to the customer — the delivery of
rupees to the recipient — is primarily
dependent on the swift and accurate trans-
mission of the appropriate delivery instruc-
tions. But to send a separate message for
each and every transaction would be highly
inefficient: hence consolidation is the order
of the day. Each consolidating hawaladar
(and for clarity’s sake let us identify him as
Ha operating in Birmingham) consequently
makes up a list — as like as not compiled
on an Excel spreadsheet — setting out all
the transactions brought to him by over-the
counter customers during the course of the
day, together with those passed on to him
by a network of agents and sub-agents
operating in smaller Pakistani communities
elsewhere in the UK, which is then faxed to
his corresponding partner Hb in Mirpur.31
Having received the fax, Hb can promptly
set about organising the local delivery of
rupees to recipients as instructed — and,
where necessary, using his own network of
agents and sub-agents to make deliveries to
recipients resident in villages in the more
remote parts of the district.
To sum up what has been achieved so
far:
— Community networks have been used
to facilitate consolidation and de-conso-
lidation at each end of the transmission
chain, incurring minimal administrative
costs.
— Deliveries have been organised in
response to faxed instructions which
provide details of each sender, each
recipient, and the amount due; detailed
records are necessary prerequisite to
accurate delivery.
— Ha has acquired a debt/liability to Hb,
but as yet there has been no transfer of
value from Ha to Hb. At some stage
this debt must of necessity be
discharged.
Step 2: The organisation and
implementation of settlement
Given that the majority of migrant work-
ers are drawn from remote rural areas, it
follows that distributing hawaladars rela-
tively rarely operate in regions where there
is no significant local demand for foreign
exchange. That is certainly the case in
Mirpur. Hence Hb rarely if ever has local
customers interested in exchanging rupees
for the sterling credits which he is con-
stantly accumulating with Ha in Birming-
ham. But in Karachi, Pakistan’s
commercial capital nearly a thousand miles
away to the south, there is an almost insati-
able demand for hard currency, for which
buyers are usually prepared to pay pre-
mium rate.32 Hence, the informal money-
markets in Mirpur and Karachi are effec-
tively mirror-images of one another. In a
pattern which is replicated in many other
countries in the developing world, remit-
tances have generated a huge demand for
local currency in the areas from which the
majority of migrants are drawn, matched
by an equally acute demand for hard cur-
rency among the more affluent sections of
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the population, most of whom reside in a
few major cities. This state of affairs pro-




As compared with hawaladars serving the
needs of migrant workers, their counter-
parts in Karachi operate in a very different
kind of financial context. Since the major-
ity of their customers are drawn from the
city’s business and professional elite, their
orders for US dollars are invariably on a
substantial scale, so much so that a single
order might well generate a sufficient
quantum of rupees to meet a week’s worth
of Hb’s daily penny package out-payments
in Mirpur. But while organising the bulk
transfer of the requisite volume of rupee
currency notes from Karachi to Mirpur
requires no more than the hiring of armed
guards to look after the shipment, a further
swap must also be implemented before the
remainder of the circle is closed. Final set-
tlement can only be achieved when the
hard-currency credits held by Ha in Bir-
mingham have been transferred to the des-
tinations specified by the customers of Hc
in Karachi.
The role of Dubai as a settlement hub
Most such Karachi-based deals are cur-
rently brokered in Dubai. Why Dubai?
Thanks to the boom in the price of oil
Dubai not only managed to establish itself
as the Gulf’s most important commercial
entrepoˆt, but as a result of its proximity to
Bombay and Karachi, the dirham’s fixed
link to the dollar, and its consequent condi-
tion of unrestricted access to the global
financial system, Dubai has become South
Asia’s premier offshore banking centre. As
a result the Exchange Houses of Dubai,
virtually all of which are run by migrants
of South Asian origin, have come to play a
key role as facilitators of remittance and
commercially driven hawala settlements on
a global scale. Hence from a newly estab-
lished hub in Dubai, hawala networks
which have their roots in mediaeval prac-
tices are again playing a very active role in
oiling the wheels of trade in the entire
Indian Ocean region.
A worked example
With all this in mind, a worked example
— albeit much simplified — may provide
a clearer and more concrete indication of
just how the whole settlement process
operates. Let us suppose that Ha in Bir-
mingham has taken orders for the delivery
of Rs10m in Mirpur, for which he has
received £75,000 from his UK-based cus-
tomers. Meanwhile Hc in Karachi has a
customer who wished to purchase
$100,000 in order to settle the invoice for
a consignment of televisions which he has
imported from China, whose manufacturer
is expecting payment to be made into his
US dollar account in Hong Kong. Ha and
Hc separately approach a specialist settle-
ment broker in Dubai, Hd, who calculates
(for the sake of argument) that Rs10m =
US$100,000 = £75,000, so generating an
ideal opportunity to arrange a back-to-
back swap. Hence Hd sets up a hawala set-
tlement in which Ha buys $100,000 on the
London money market through his bank
which he promptly sends by TT to Hd’s
account with the Bank of America in
New York; meanwhile Hc takes delivery
of Rs10m in cash from his television-
importing customer, which he promptly
despatches by road to Hb in Mirpur,
thereby recompensing Hb for the disburse-
ments made in response to Ha’s previously
faxed instructions; and to close the whole
deal, Hd transfers $100,000 by Swift or TT
from his account in New York to the tele-
vision manufacturer’s account in Hong
Kong.
It goes without saying that the example
cited is hugely simplified, and that in prac-
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tice most settlements are a great deal more
complex. Indeed if matters were so
straightforward, there is every prospect
that Hc in Karachi might approach Ha in
Birmingham directly, and having found a
neat match between their immediate finan-
cial requirements the two would do a
simple swap between themselves, thereby
cutting Hd (and his small percentage cut)
out of the deal. Indeed precisely because
everyone in the system is constantly seek-
ing to construct such cut-out deals, brokers
in Dubai — whose principal asset is a
global network of trading contacts —
invariably play their cards extremely close
to their chest. Hence they rarely, if ever,
provide an indication of the other clients
on whose behalf they are acting.
Such brokers are also in active competi-
tion as between themselves, and conse-
quently constantly seeking to outwit their
rivals. Hence, for example, Dubai-based
brokers regularly trawl for clients in the
UK. Besides tempting local hawaladars to
pass business their way by offering a mar-
ginally more attractive $/Rs conversion
rate, they also seek to cultivate more sub-
stantial business clients, such as Asian cash-
and-carry clothing wholesalers whose sup-
pliers in South Asia and the Far East are by
no means averse to having all or part of
their invoices settled through informal
channels. It follows that the settlement
deals which brokers construct are often
extremely complex. Opportunities to
implement neatly matched inter-currency
swaps such as that cited in the above exam-
ple are rare: in practice the chips on the
table are invariably composed of large but
irregularly sized sums deriving from and
going to a wide variety of destinations in a
multiplicity of different currencies. Hence
settlements invariably require the lubricat-
ing assistance of skilled and well-informed
brokers if they are to be swiftly and
smoothly implemented.
Physical cash plays little or no role at
this level, since the basic unit of account in
making such settlements is US$100,000,
multiples of which are put together to
close a single deal. Such transactions are
invariably completed by electronic trans-
fers, most usually between accounts held
by hawaladars and their clients in major
international banks in New York.33 Exami-
nation of these accounts also suggests that
while migrant remittances flowing from
developed to less developed regions pro-
vide the greater part of the system’s hard-
currency liquidity, they are by no means
its only source: just as in Karachi, a signifi-
cant number of UK-based commer-
cial enterprises — most of which appear
to be Asian owned — also use the system
to meet the invoices of their overseas
suppliers.
System security and financial efficiency
Dubai-based brokers by no means restrict
themselves to providing settlement facilities
for UK/Pakistan transfers: they also per-
form the same role for migrant workers
based in most parts of Western Europe and
North America, and to this author’s
knowledge are in a position to facilitate
value deliveries to Somalia, Iraq, Iran,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, India and
Central Asia — and doubtless many further
destinations in East and South-East Asia as
well. They also facilitate transactions for
commercial enterprises on what appears to
be a truly global scale. In doing so billions
of dollars are processed through Dubai-
based IVTS/hawala networks every year.
Yet despite the absence of any kind of cen-
tral registry, let alone external regulatory
scrutiny, serious customer complaints are
virtually unknown. How can this be? By
now the basic answer should be self-evi-
dent: like the precolonial structures from
which they evolved, contemporary hawala
networks are best understood as distributed
systems in which system security is rooted
in the transnationally extended relation-
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ships of absolute trust between participat-
ing hawaladars. Given that all members of
the network have a powerful interest in
maintaining the integrity of the whole
exercise, system security is a matter of col-
lective concern. Hence in a manner wholly
congruent with Greif’s predictions, not
only do contemporary hawaladars go to
great lengths to maintain their reputation
for honesty vis-a`-vis each other, but they
know that there is no escape from sanctions
against malfeasance when electronic com-
munication ensures that any doubts about a
network member’s reputation can be
spread instantly round the globe.
Moreover with a historical perspective in
mind, we should not be surprised at the
vitality of such practices. Economic histor-
ians inspired by Greif’s model have shown
that his approach is equally applicable in a
range of more recent Euro-American con-
texts, including the Amsterdam Bourse
during the 17th century,34 the City of
London a century later,35 as well as mid-
19th century California.36 Given that the
cultural resources for the maintenance of
such coalitions are still in place in 21st-cen-
tury Dubai — as well as in Hong Kong
and Singapore for that matter — it is only
to be expected that similar structures are
still in use in such contexts, most especially
since they provide such a highly effective
means of guaranteeing system security
while also promoting financial efficiency.
As Greif puts it:
‘By reducing agency costs and other
transaction costs, the coalition promoted
efficiency. It enabled operation through
agents, even when the cost of estab-
lishing agency relations between a
specific merchant and an agent in
isolation was prohibitively high. In
addition, the Merchants’ Law econo-
mized on negotiation cost, governed the
transmission of information and the
provision of services, and substituted
comprehensive contracts in the relations
between a specific agent and
merchant.’37
It is with precisely such considerations in
mind that the competitive advantage
which ‘informal’ — or to be more precise,
‘trust-based’ — value transfer systems so
often find themselves springs immediately
into focus. Specialising as they do in the
narrow — but still substantial — niche in
the forex market, their prime source of
competitive efficiency derives from their
ability to discard as operationally redun-
dant large swathes of clerical and bureau-
cratic activity deployed within the formal
sector, replacing them wherever possible
with relationships of trust. That said, IVTS
networks are in no sense ‘systems without
records’. Quite the contrary: accurate data
transmission is a key to their success. But
by stripping out layers of redundant cleri-
cal activity and by making the most of on-
going developments in IT, IVTS networks
have cut their information transmission
costs to a fraction of those incurred by
more formally constituted agencies.
Information transfer in trust-based
networks
So just what information is transmitted
through such networks? All this author’s
observations suggest this is normally lim-
ited strictly to that which is necessary to
enable the recipient to carry out his
instructions. Hence in the example cited
earlier, Ha in Birmingham would fax volu-
minous instructions to Hb in Mirpur as to
exactly how much should be delivered to a
long list of recipients; likewise Ha would
also regularly receive instructions from Hd
in Dubai with whom he had previously
cut a deal as to the sums to be transferred
by TT in US dollars to bank accounts in
New York. Moreover just as Hb in Mirpur
would probably not know (and would cer-
tainly not need to know) where the funds
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dispatched to him by Ha had come from,
Ha would be even less likely to know who
the ultimate recipient of the funds he had
transferred in US dollars might be. Simi-
larly, while Hd would have a clear over-
view of both sides of his wholesale swap,
he would have had no knowledge of the
multiplicity of smaller deals Ha and his
associates had made with their many part-
ner Hbs.
Within this highly competitive distribu-
ted system (for hawaladars at every level
are in constant competition with one
another) participants have not only
adopted a ‘lean and mean’ approach to data
transmission between themselves, but have
also taken immediate advantage of every
new development in communications tech-
nology. International subscriber dialling
and mobile phones were a substantial
advance over telegrams, and from there
hawaladars have moved rapidly onwards
to use fax, e-mail, network portals and
Virtual Private Networks as vehicles for
information transmission, while all the
larger operators — and an ever-increasing
number of smaller ones — now plug
directly into inter-bank electronic systems
such as TT, BACS and Swift as a means of
value transfer.
Given these developments, care must be
taken in assessing the significance of the
term ‘informal’ when used as a descriptor
of IVTS networks. Informality in this con-
text has nothing whatsoever to do with
casual ‘back of an envelope’ methods of
record keeping. Instead ‘informality’ is
better understood as an artefact of partici-
pants’ success in building binding networks
of inter-personal reciprocity on a transna-
tional basis, which in turn provide a means
of implementing a highly specific form of
financial activity: the exchange and trans-
mission of value on a global scale. By con-
fining themselves to this specific niche, and
by generating a secure but distributed
system to implement what at first sight
appears to be an impossibly challenging
logistical task, hawaladars and other IVTS
operators have been able both to lower
administrative costs and to implement ‘just
in time’ methods of value delivery. It is on
precisely this basis that they owe their
current position of competitive advantage
vis-a`-vis their more formally constituted
rivals.
EXTERNAL INTERVENTION
In the UK as elsewhere, there was a sub-
stantial delay between the initial emergence
of these logistical networks from within
local South Asian ethnic colonies and the
point at which regulatory authorities began
to take serious cognisance of these develop-
ments. At one level the reasons for delay
were quite straightforward: at the outset
the value transfers were so small, and the
networks were ordered in such a casual
way that no one outside the colonies them-
selves had much prospect of detecting their
existence. However subterranean the initial
hatching of these initiatives may have been,
it did not take long before they surfaced
into public view — most usually through a
store-front presence, frequently in combi-
nation with a travel agency providing
migrant workers with cheap tickets for
visits back home.
As soon as the through-put of cash in
any given outlet became substantial — as
was immediately the case when consolidat-
ing hawaladars began to process the cash
takings on behalf of ever-widening net-
works of agents and sub-agents — their
role as money-transmitters became much
more self-evident to outsiders. By the close
of the millennium the most successful
operators had opened US dollar accounts
with their local banks, arranged for a live
feed of exchange rates to be piped directly
to their offices, and had made arrangements
with Securicor or Brinks to collect trunks
of ready-counted cash for delivery to their
bank on a daily basis. Nor was there any
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secret about the business which they were
conducting. As their bankers were well
aware, they were in the business of money
transmission. Hence their minimum
requirement was for a US dollar account
to run alongside their sterling account,
together with direct access to the bank’s
dealing room, so enabling the purchase of
US dollars on the spot market. From the
mid-1960s, when hawala networks first
began to emerge into daylight, right up
until 2000, the UK authorities made few
efforts either to explore the details of these
operations, or to subject them to formal
regulation. Since then there has been a
radical change of approach.
Criminal prosecution
In the closing years of the 1990s one of the
most important strategies on which Cus-
toms and Excise had come to rely in their
efforts to curb the import of heroin into
the UK ran into severe difficulties: the
courts began to take the view that their
well-established participating informant-led
programme of identifying and prosecuting
UK-based drug smugglers was flawed, so
much so that it had to be abandoned.38 In
the face of this setback Customs and Excise
decided that they had little alternative but
to change course. They let it be known
that rather than trying to catch drug smug-
glers red-handed, they would aim instead
to disrupt their financial supply chains.
Their new approach was highlighted in an
article in the Observer, in which David
Rose reported that:
‘At present, about a quarter of the 1,200
UK Customs investigators devoted to
fighting the drugs trade work mainly in
following the huge amounts of money
involved, a proportion which is set to
triple over the next two years. Again,
there have been significant recent
successes. In one pending prosecution, it
is alleged that a network of bogus travel
agencies laundered more than £1bn over
three years on behalf of Turkish and
Pakistani traffickers, channelling funds
from Britain via Dubai to Pakistan.’39
By the time Rose’s clearly officially-
inspired article appeared, the present
author was already aware of the change in
Customs’ strategic priorities, since the
author had been instructed to act as an
expert witness by the defence in three
linked prosecutions of consolidating hawa-
ladars based in Bradford and Halifax, the
first major court cases to which Customs’
new initiative had given rise.40 Since then
the author has been instructed to fulfil the
same role in half a dozen more such cases.
While the details varied considerably from
case to case, the author found the three
cases — all of which involved Pakistani
hawaladars conducting wholesale foreign-
exchange business in the manner just
described — to be particularly illuminat-
ing. Their records were particularly
detailed, the volume of funds which they
had handled was substantial — a total of
more than £600m during the 18-month
period with which the prosecution was
concerned — and the whole operation was
set in social, cultural and territorial contexts
with which the author was already thor-
oughly familiar.
When these cases finally came to trial one
of the central issues on which the proceed-
ings turned was the precise provenance, as
well as the ultimate destination, of the
funds which the hawaladars processed.
Although Customs accepted that at least
some of these transfers could be assumed to
be genuine migrant remittances, they
insisted that this was only so when it could
be shown that clients had arrived in person
to hand cash directly over the counter, and
had given directions for the delivery of cash
to a named person at a destination in Paki-
stan. Having set up this paradigm of a ‘gen-
uine’ transfer, the prosecution noted that
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only a relatively small proportion of the
funds handled by consolidating hawaladars
were of this kind. Far from receiving the
bulk of their business from over-the-coun-
ter customers, Customs produced surveil-
lance evidence which revealed that the
defendants had received large bulk deliv-
eries of cash from elsewhere in the UK on
an almost daily basis. While the defendants
did not deny that they had received these
deliveries, the prosecution insisted that
unless they were able to provide an expla-
nation of the precise provenance of these
deliveries, the only sensible conclusion that
the jury could reach was that these transfers
must be the outcome of some form of
criminal malfeasance. To reinforce this
hypothesis the prosecution also noted that
although the hawaladars said they were
facilitating the transfer of remittances to
Pakistan, their US dollar denominated
bank accounts revealed that the bulk of
these funds were not sent to Pakistan, but
rather to New York. On this basis the pro-
secution argued that in the absence of any
further explanation, there was only one
reason why the hawaladars should have
been involved in processing vast amounts
of cash in this way: as part of a criminal
conspiracy to launder the profits accrued by
drug smugglers. Strikingly, however, Cus-
toms was able to produce very little con-
crete evidence that the cash in question was
indeed derived from the sale of drugs, other
than laboratory evidence suggesting that
the level of contamination in samples of the
impounded currency notes was significantly
higher than that in circulation at large.41
With the burden of proof effectively
reversed, the defence found itself pressed
firmly onto the back foot. Even if (and
indeed precisely because) the transfers pro-
cessed by the accused hawaladars were
entirely in keeping with the model out-
lined in this paper, the defendants found
themselves hard pressed to provide com-
prehensive answers to the questions pressed
on them by the prosecution, and to do so
in a manner which might make any
impression on a financially unsophisticated
jury. The reasons are quite straightforward.
Given the spare and carefully compart-
mentalised manner on the basis of which
hawala swaps are constructed, it followed
that while UK-based hawaladars had
detailed records of the ultimate destinations
of the transfers which they had made on
behalf of their own over-the-counter cus-
tomers, as well as of the instructions which
they had received from the brokers with
whom they did business in Dubai, they
rarely, if ever, had detailed knowledge of
the precise provenance of the consolidated
tranches of cash which they had agreed to
process on behalf of these brokers,42 or just
who the ultimate beneficiaries of the funds
in US dollars which they transferred by
TT to New York would be. And while
they were well aware of the identity of the
other UK-based hawaladars whose funds
they had processed — and indeed of the
Dubai-based brokers whose instructions
they had followed — their partners were
most unwilling to appear in court to give
evidence in the UK. One can see why:
even if they were not already on the
charge-sheet,43 they were likely to be asked
just the same questions about their own
customers, and to find themselves faced
with immediate prosecution if they were
unable to provide adequate answers.
Such a response could be taken, at least
on the face of it, to be grounds for yet
further suspicion. In the first place the
hawaladars were unable to conform to the
most basic requirements of AML proce-
dures, in the sense that they were unable to
identify either the precise provenance or
the ultimate destination of the greater part
of the funds passing through their hands.
Secondly, there is no reason to doubt that
informal hawala networks could in principle
have been used as a convenient channel
through which to launder illegitimately
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acquired funds. What the author personally
found alarming in all these cases, however,
is that despite the extensive surveillance
operations which Customs conducted prior
to the defendants’ arrests, in none of the
prosecutions of which he has first-hand
knowledge was there any concrete evi-
dence showing that the cash in question
was actually generated as the result of the
sale of illegally imported drugs: instead
juries were simply invited to support the
hypothesis that the hawaladars must indeed
have been doing just that. In these circum-
stances the defendants not only found
themselves being invited to prove a nega-
tive, but to do so in thoroughly adverse
circumstances. Although the transactions
which gave rise to these proceedings
occurred well over a year beforehand, the
cases all came to court in the aftermath of
the events of 9/11. Hence the defendants —
almost all of whom were Muslim — faced
an even steeper uphill struggle to establish
their credibility. Few succeeded. So far,
virtually all those who contested such accu-
sations were found guilty as charged.
Two of these cases, however, recently
came before the Court of Appeal, which
quashed the convictions of all concerned
on the grounds that the appellants should
not have been convicted unless the Crown
had been in a position to prove that they
knew — as opposed to having been in a
position where they should reasonably
have suspected — that the cash which the
hawaladars had handled was indeed the
profits of drug smuggling.44 Having so
ruled, the Court also took the opportunity
to raise a query about the prosecution’s use
of a charge of conspiracy (directed at the
hawala network) in pursuing these cases,
politely indicating that by adopting its
chosen course ‘the prosecution has a hea-
vier burden to discharge than it would
have in order to prove the substantive
charge’ (ie of profiting from the sale of
drugs). In other words, the Court sug-
gested that the prosecution would have
been in a much stronger position if drug
smugglers, rather than those alleged to be
the launderers of their profits, had been the
central focus of the proceedings. While the
Court of Appeal directed that Customs
should begin proceedings for a re-trial
using a differently phrased indictment
within two months if they wished to con-
tinue to pursue the matter, the conse-
quences of this ruling will almost certainly
be far reaching. Not only are most of the
other hawala cases in which Customs
deployed similar arguments likely to be
quashed on the same grounds, but the deci-
sion may well open up a new and better-
informed debate about just how hawala
networks should be regulated.
Adjustments to adversity
Nevertheless there was an interval of nearly
five years between the arrest of the initial
group of hawaladars and their recent suc-
cessful appeal, during which both hawala-
dars and their customers had to cope with
much more hostile attitudes from the
authorities. Nevertheless the market for
value transfers was in no sense diminished,
not least because members of the UK’s
Pakistani population were as committed as
ever to the maintenance of their links with
their homeland. Besides making frequent
visits to Pakistan, they continued to remit
substantial sums to support family activities
back home, and to invest in house con-
struction. How, then, did they react?
By good fortune the author was in Paki-
stan in the spring of 2000 — in other
words immediately before the crackdown
took place — exploring precisely these
issues. During the course of fieldwork he
was able to establish that the vast bulk of
the remittance transfers from the UK to
Mirpur were by then passing through the
informal sector.45 The central reason for
this was not hard to identify: over and
above issues of speed and convenience, the
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exchange rate offered by hawaladars was
substantially higher than that offered by
formally constituted banks, so much so
that the flow of value through the formal
sector had fallen close to zero. As news of
Customs’ successful prosecution of hawala-
dars began to circulate, however, further
supplemented by lurid accounts of the
allegedly criminal character of hawala
which appeared in the press in the after-
math of 9/11, many remitters decided to
err on the side of caution: much more
extensive use began to be made of formal
channels, even though the transaction costs
were substantially higher.
Although hawaladars have by now
regained a significant share of the transfer
market, the arrests in the UK, strongly
aided and abetted by the global impact of
the Patriot Act, had a dramatic impact on
the formally recorded inflow of remit-
tances into Pakistan: as Figure 1 shows, the
Balance of Payments figures compiled by
the State Bank of Pakistan indicated that
the formally recorded inflow of migrant
remittances from all sources during fiscal
year 2003 was no less than four times
greater than it had been in 2001.
Nevertheless it would be idle to suppose
that this very substantial switch into the
formal sector had brought the hawala
system to its knees. While there can be no
doubt that migrant remittances make an
enormous contribution to Pakistan’s econ-
omy — just as they do in many other
labour-exporting countries — interpreting
the significance of the data set out in
Figure 1 is far from easy. Over and above
such perennial questions as precisely how
migrant remittances should be defined, and
how effectively local officials succeeded in
distinguishing migrant remittances from
those derived from other sources, there is
no reason to suppose that informal remit-
tance transfers had dried up completely by
FY 2003. Moreover, the fall in the
recorded inflow in 2004 seems much more
likely to indicate a resurgence of activity in
the informal sector than a diminution in
overseas Pakistanis’ propensity to remit. In
other words, while the crackdown on
IVTS networks which followed in the
wake of the events of 9/11 was undoubt-
edly a setback to the hawala networks
operating out of Dubai,46 the damage
inflicted was far from terminal: instead
operators have made concerted efforts to




























Figure 1 Annual formally recorded inflow of migrant remittances to Pakistan
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requirements, stimulating all manner of
further developments.
The hawaladars’ response
When the crackdown came, only a tiny
minority of UK-based hawaladars were
prosecuted. Although a significant propor-
tion — but by no means all — of those
acting as consolidators were subject to pro-
secution, virtually all the smaller operators
— probably several thousand strong —
were left unscathed. Moreover, once it
became clear that it was the receipt of cash
deposits on a wholesale basis which ren-
dered them vulnerable to prosecution,
most smaller operators adopted the obvious
remedy: instead of passing on the funds
collected from retail clients to consolidat-
ing hawaladars for conversion into US dol-
lars and onward transmission overseas, as
they had done hitherto, they simply
opened foreign exchange accounts of their
own. To be sure, they consequently lost
access to the economies of scale from
which the consolidators had hitherto bene-
fited, thereby adding to their costs. But by
making some minor adjustments to Cus-
toms’ satisfaction, they found that they
were in a position to recover their business.
One immediate consequence was that the
UK-based dimension of hawala networks
suffered considerable fragmentation, given
that local hawaladars had little alternative
but to present themselves as sole operators.
Nevertheless, there are now strong indica-
tions that commercial logic consolidation is
now reasserting itself, although the resultant
deficit is now being remedied from over-
seas. During 2004 and 2005 several leading
exchange houses in Dubai — led by Wall
Street Exchange and Al-Ansari Exchange,
both formally constituted limited liability
companies (LLCs) — set up internet-based
value transfer systems operating on a global
basis. Having done so they have formally
signed up local hawaladars operating in the
UK and elsewhere as their agents.47 If the
author understands current developments
correctly, the greater part of the consolidat-
ing role formerly fulfilled by the now-con-
victed UK-based consolidated hawaladars
has now effectively been repatriated to the
major Dubai-based Exchange houses
through which global settlements had long
been implemented. If so, it follows that
UK-based regulators will now have even
less access to the financial sinews of the
operation than they did when UK-based
consolidators played a much more active
role in its implementation. Just what impact
the recent decision of the Court of Appeal
will have on these developments still
remains to be seen.
ISSUES FOR REGULATORS
The growing salience of trust-based IVTS
networks — of which the hawala opera-
tions discussed in this paper are but one
specific example — clearly pose a major
challenge to currently conventional regula-
tory procedures. Given their parsimonious
— yet financially and economically
rational — approach to record-keeping,
IVTS networks do not generate massive,
and endlessly duplicated, documentary
archives of contractual agreements, deliv-
ery notes, receipts and so forth. Hawaladars
do of course keep records, and regularly
transmit extremely detailed instructions to
their partners with respect to issues of
implementation. But although this
approach makes for high levels of financial
efficiency, it represents a major headache
for regulators committed to an audit-trail
approach, for there is no central registry —
even in Dubai — in which all these data
are stored. In such circumstances construct-
ing an audit trail ceases to be a paper exer-
cise: any attempt to ‘follow the money’
would have to be implemented quite lit-
erally, by visiting the offices of a global
network of hawaladars.48
In the light of all this, can IVTS net-
works be brought within some kind of
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meaningful regulatory framework? The
author’s impression is that very few hawa-
ladars are opposed in principle to the pro-
spect of being subjected to regulation,
always provided that such a regime takes
adequate cognisance of the logic of their
business practices.49 If so, the principal
obstacle to progress is not so much the
hawaladars themselves, but rather construc-
tion of a regulatory framework which is fit
for purpose. Yet just what should those
purposes be? To escape from the blinkers
precipitated by narrow post-9/11 concerns,
it is useful to begin by going back to basics
and reminding ourselves just what it is that
the current range of regulatory frame-
works are designed to achieve. As far as
the author can see, the objectives of such
frameworks fall into three broad spheres:
— Fiscal: to constrain individual and
corporate efforts to circumvent their
liability to pay taxes and duties, and to
comply with any other fiscal restric-
tions which the state might impose.
— Financial: to ensure that the funds
lodged with commercial enterprises by
retail clients are adequately protected
against malfeasance, and that the finan-
cial system as a whole remains suffi-
ciently robust to render the probability
of system collapse remote.
— Forensic: to prevent criminally acquired
funds from circulating within the estab-
lished financial order.
Of the three, fiscal regulation is the most
ancient: taxes, and the necessity to appoint
inspectors to monitor concerted efforts by
subjects to avoid paying their dues is a phe-
nomenon as old as the state itself. By con-
trast the emergence of state-sponsored
regulation of commercial practices is a
much more recent phenomenon, largely
precipitated by the failure — especially in
Euro-American contexts — of more long-
established trust-based procedures of self-
regulation.
By contrast the introduction regulatory
initiatives to meet specifically forensic
objectives is a much more recent phenom-
enon. As Naylor puts it:
‘Over the last fifteen years there has been
a quiet revolution in law enforcement.
These days, instead of just closing down
rackets, law enforcement goes after the
earnings from crime on the theory that
confiscating the yield removes both
motive (profit) and means (operating
capital) to commit further crimes.
Therefore a new offence — money
laundering — has been added to the
statutes of many countries. Tougher
reporting requirements have been
imposed on financial institutions. And
law enforcement agencies now host
special units responsible for arresting not
malefactors but bank accounts, invest-
ment portfolios, houses, cars, even Rolex
watches. These initiatives are closely
related. Detailed records create a paper
trail that aids tracing criminal money,
while anti-money laundering laws create
new offences to justify its seizure.’50
Against that background the wave of
AML/CFT regulations let loose by the
Patriot Act is the culmination of these
developments. As Naylor goes on to argue
at length, these forensically driven mea-
sures are different in kind from their finan-
cially and fiscally oriented counterparts:
their objective is not so much to maintain
integrity of the economic order, but to
require agency in the financial services
sector to assist the law enforcement autho-
rities by scrutinising each and every trans-
action passing through their hands for
what the regulations proclaim to be tell-
tale signs of money laundering.
While terrorism and drug smuggling
are very real problems in the contempor-
ary world — and most especially so in a
world where funds of all kinds are routi-
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nely moved around at the click of a
mouse — there are now growing con-
cerns that the blunderbuss approach to
regulation enshrined in AML/CFT is close
to being counterproductive.51 The collat-
eral costs are proving to be enormous,52
but there are few signs that the ultimate
targets of the whole exercise are suffering
any significant damage, not least because
identifying transfers which are actually
associated with drug smuggling and the
financing of terrorism is a substantially
more difficult task than finding a needle
in a haystack. This is not to suggest that
all efforts to catch such miscreants should
be abandoned, and still less to argue that
all efforts to improve regulatory proce-
dures in this arena are bound to be nuga-
tory. But it is to insist that a
comprehensive reassessment of the utility
of current initiatives needs to be made if
real — as opposed to symbolic — pro-
gress is to be achieved.
Formal and informal procedures
compared
While this is no place from which to
embark on such a grand reassessment, it is
nevertheless worth presenting a brief
review of whether informally constituted
value transmission systems are indeed more
vulnerable to malfeasance than their more
formally organised counterparts, and if so,
how those deficiencies might best be reme-
died. In doing so three distinct sets of ques-
tions need to be addressed. First, is it the
case — as is widely assumed — that IVTS
networks are wholly unprotected against
potential malfeasance in all three spheres
just identified? Secondly, if self-regulatory
measures of a protective sort are in fact
available in some or all of these spheres,
how does their effectiveness compare with
those currently in place in the formal
sector? Thirdly, what measures might rea-
sonably be taken to fill the resulting loop-
holes?
Money smuggling
On the fiscal front, it is quite clear that
IVTS networks can be — and indeed very
frequently are — utilised by those who
wish to shift value between one financial
jurisdiction and another in such a way that
the transaction does not come to the atten-
tion of the revenue-seeking and/or the
exchange control arms of national treasu-
ries. This is not to say that IVTS networks
are exclusively utilised by those seeking to
circumvent such fiscal controls, since
migrant remittances cannot be so classified,
but it is undoubtedly the case that some of
the outflow from the developed world,
and a significant portion of the counter-
trade from the developing world is com-
posed of transactions of this kind. Never-
theless ‘money smuggling’ in this sense is
in no way uniquely confined to the infor-
mal sector. These transfers run alongside —
and indeed are dwarfed by — the huge
volume of footloose funds currently circu-
lated between on- and offshore institutions
located within the formally constituted
financial sector, 53 a significant proportion
of whose business is concerned with pro-
viding their clients with expert advice on
how best to minimise their fiscal liabil-
ities.54
System security
Those who insist that there is an urgent
need to subject IVTS networks to formal
regulation often seek to justify their posi-
tion by arguing that in the absence of ade-
quate external supervision, retail customers’
interests will remain entirely unprotected
against malfeasance. Such arguments rest
on a lack of awareness of, or failing that a
lack of confidence in, the capacity of trust-
based coalitions to generate system secur-
ity. While customers of trust-based systems
reap financial benefits from passing their
funds through operations whose overhead
expenses are very much lower than those
which rely on more complex bureaucratic
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procedures, there is little evidence that their
funds are significantly endangered by so
doing. Despite the huge sums routinely
processed through IVTS/hawala networks,
complaints of malfeasance are extremely
rare. Precisely as Greif’s model predicts,
given their status as coalition members it is
in every hawaladar’s personal interest to
sustain his reputation for probity vis-a`-vis
clients and colleagues, and in the coalition’s
collective interest to take prompt action to
exclude any network member whose prob-
ity is in any way in doubt.
That said, it is equally clear that such
trust-based relationships of reciprocity
cannot be universalised. Quite the con-
trary. They gain their effectiveness pre-
cisely because of their deployment within a
limited coalition made up of people of simi-
lar ethnic origin, who utilise culturally spe-
cific understandings and behavioural
conventions to underpin their financial
dealings.55 In the contemporary world the
capacity of Euro-Americans to build such
coalitions of trust has largely fallen into
abeyance: hence, among other things the
ever greater salience of formal regulation.
However in many other cultural traditions
— and most especially those grounded in
South and East Asia — the capacity to con-
struct such coalitions is still alive and well.
Given the much lower level overheads
incurred when such strategies are deployed,
it is idle to assume that they are likely to
be abandoned with any speed, no matter
how much hegemonically conceived Euro-
American assumptions may lead some
observers to assert that such coalitions are
by definition no more than criminal con-
spiracies.
Drugs and terrorism
Although tax avoidance is in principle just
as much a criminal offence as is smuggling
drugs and engaging in terrorism, few
observers would dispute that offences of
the latter kind are infinitely more serious
than tax avoidance. With that distinction
in mind, the use of the single catch-all
term ‘money laundering’ to cover these
very different forms of malfeasance, can
only be described as unhelpful. Besides
erasing the differing degrees of seriousness
in underlying acts of malfeasance, such an
elision also obscures a further important
difference between the two sets of offences.
If the funds transferred in the course of
efforts to avoid taxation were legitimately
acquired, as is most usually the case, the
resultant malfeasance is primarily fiscal in
character, and any subsequent prosecution
will normally focus on the transfer itself —
since it is this which leads to removal of
the funds from both the purview and the
jurisdiction of the revenue authorities. By
contrast the AML/CFT regime takes a very
different approach, since it is not so much
the transfers themselves which are the
nominal target, but rather the source from
which the funds so transferred were origin-
ally derived (as in drug smuggling), or the
purposes for which the funds are destined
to be deployed (as in terrorism), which
render the transactions illegal.
While most of the successful ‘money
laundering’ prosecutions in the USA have
focused on breaches of regulatory proce-
dures, the approach deployed in the UK
has so far been rather different. Most of the
prosecutions launched against hawaladars
in the UK have been framed in terms of
conspiracy to contravene s. 49(2) of the
Drug Trafficking Act, which indicates that:
‘A person is guilty of an offence if,
knowing or having reasonable grounds
to suspect that any property is, or in
whole or in part directly or indirectly
represents, another person’s proceeds of
drug trafficking, he —
(a) conceals or disguises that property,
or
(b) converts or transfers that property
or removes it from the jurisdiction,
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for the purpose of assisting any person to
avoid prosecution for a drug trafficking
offence.’
In quashing the cases which came before it,
the Court of Appeal ruled that in the
absence of concrete evidence that identifi-
able components of the money handled by
the hawaladars were indeed the proceeds of
drug smuggling, and also the introduction
of evidence showing that the hawaladars
had access to knowledge that the funds in
question were indeed so generated,56 their
convictions could not stand. But although
one line of attack may now be closed, it is
still far from clear as to what alternative
measures will be pursued. If the UK begins
to follow US precedents, hawaladars could
well find themselves charged with breach-
ing AML/CFT regulations. Provided that
prosecutors managed to escape the neces-
sity to prove anything at all about the ori-
gins of the funds in question, they might
well have a considerably greater prospect
of success.
Yet just how much of a ‘success’ would
such a procedure actually constitute? In a
dangerous sleight of hand, a central conse-
quence of such an approach is that financial
agencies rather than criminal perpetrators
become the central focus of forensic scru-
tiny. With such a blunderbuss in place, it
becomes very easy for the authorities to
make dramatic claims about the successful
prosecution of the War on Terror and/or
Drugs, even if few if any of their highly
publicised ‘busts’ ever enable them to iden-
tify, let alone to catch, their ultimate tar-
gets. Could it be that all that such an
approach yields is the successful prosecu-
tion of unfortunate scapegoats?
CONCLUSION
Despite all these alarms and discursions, the
prime focus of this paper has not been on
matters of drug smuggling, and still less on
terrorist financing. Rather its central con-
cern has been with the financial and regula-
tory challenges thrown up by the ever-
increasing globalisation of the world econ-
omy. With such matters in mind, it should
be read as a reminder that globalisation is a
two-way process. While recent advances in
communications technology may have
provided Euro-American enterprises with
an opportunity to engage in globalisation
‘from above’ on an unprecedented scale,
those same developments have also pro-
vided non-European entrepreneurs with
some equally unprecedented opportunities
to play the same game in reverse, and on
that basis to mount all manner of counter-
challenges ‘from below’. This paper con-
cerns itself with a specific dimension of
these counter-hegemonic processes: those
associated with the recent surge in labour
migration from the developing to the
developed world, and the equally spectacu-
lar growth of financial transfers in the
reverse direction, such that in many of the
poorest parts of the developing world the
inflow of value precipitated by migrant
remittances now comfortably exceeds that
generated by official development aid and
foreign direct investment combined.57
A salient feature of all such processes of
globalisation ‘from below’ is that they owe
little or nothing to international assistance
‘from above’. On the contrary, virtually all
are intrinsically subversive in two inter-
linked senses. First, they have emerged as a
creative response to the ever more salient
forces of Euro-American hegemony, and
secondly because the inspiration behind
them has invariably been grounded in the
creative exploitation of the alterity of their
indigenous cultural capital — in other
words the resources embedded within the
distinctive social, ideological, familial and
religious heritage of each such group. This
paper highlights one such success story.
Having made extensive use of the resources
of their kinship networks to create ‘escala-
tors’ which delivered large numbers of
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migrants of similar origins into specific
niches in labour markets throughout the
developing world,58 specialist entrepreneurs
operating from within the midst of the
resultant transnational networks have uti-
lised those self-same resources to develop
highly effective value transfer systems to
deliver their fellow migrants’ savings back
to the relatively impoverished areas from
which they originally departed, no matter
how remote their location might be. In
terms of grass-roots economic development
these initiatives can only be described as
exceedingly welcome, even though the
efficiency and autonomy with which these
networks transfer the resultant liquidity
may well be a source of considerable alarm
to more formally constituted structures and
institutions which regard the prospect of
being cut out of a major profit-generating
loop as unwelcome in the extreme.59
Against this must be set the prospect that
these networks could be utilised as conve-
nient vehicles within which to conceal a
major downside of globalisation: drug-
smuggling and the provision of funds to
terrorists. That IVTS networks could be so
used is undeniable. There can be no dis-
pute, however, that those with such nefar-
ious purposes in mind could, and regularly
do, use the services of formally constituted
banks. All that stands in the way is the pro-
duction of documentary evidence sufficient
to satisfy the demands of AML/CFT regu-
lations: few would suggest that that is a
serious obstacle to a reasonably well-pre-
pared terrorist or drug smuggler.60
By contrast the barriers in the way of
entry into hawala networks, no matter
how ‘informal’, appear to be considerably
more substantial. Local hawaladars nor-
mally serve specific communities, and
hence expect to be able to identify their
customers on a personal basis without
demanding sight of a utility bill. More-
over, when a hawaladar deals with a custo-
mer wishing to transfer a very substantial
sum (ie in the tens of thousands of pounds)
additional considerations come into play.
Given his responsibilities as a member of a
wider coalition, together with the fact that
all his transactions with customers — and
especially such a large transaction — are
underpinned by a relationship of mutual
trust, hawaladars expect (and indeed are
expected to) to establish a personal relation-
ship with their customers. In consequence
hawaladars invariably expect to establish a
personal relationship with such senders,
and consequently to gain more than an
inkling of the nature of their business activ-
ities, before agreeing to despatch a substan-
tial sum on their behalf. To be sure,
hawaladars do not normally pass on such
information to their partners elsewhere in
the network: there is no intrinsic need to
transmit such data. By accepting instruc-
tions from a customer, hawaladars put
their own bona fides vis-a`-vis all their other
partners in the coalition on the line, and in
doing so expose themselves to the prospect
of severe sanctions should they put the
security of the entire coalition unnecessarily
and irresponsibly at risk.61
While it would be unwise to assume that
this trip-wire will always prove effective,
precisely because front-line hawaladars
invariably maintain personal relationships
with their clients, they are particularly well
placed to assist the authorities in their
efforts to track down major criminals —
always provided that the authorities are
prepared to accept the essential legitimacy
of their financial modus operandi. Given that
hawaladars have a built-in interest in keep-
ing their business clean, forensic investiga-
tors would surely be much better advised
to seek the active cooperation of hawala-
dars in their efforts to gather intelligence
about the likely perpetrators of such
unlawful activities, rather than insisting
that they produce mountains of indigestible
paper, while threatening dire retribution
should they not conform to these essen-
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tially bureaucratic requirements. The same
might well be true of businesses operating
in the formal sector, even if their personal
knowledge of their clients may often be of
a rather lower order.
In the light of all this, the current use of
AML/CFT regulatory procedures as a
means — and perhaps even as the principal
means — of tracking down drug smugglers
and terrorists appears to be seriously mista-
ken. The result of deflecting attention
away from substantive offenders in favour
of the financial networks they allegedly
utilise has precipitated a wholly predictable
outcome: unfortunate scapegoats, distin-
guished primarily by their alterity, have
been found guilty of serious criminal
offences, while the real offenders have
escaped scot-free. Meanwhile the prospect
of criminal investigators gaining the coop-
eration of network members in their efforts
to track down those perpetrators has been
actively undermined by their regulatory
colleagues’ application of a blunderbuss
approach. Worse still, the implementation
of the new regulatory regime has also
added to the burden of overheads carried
by the financial services industry, all of
which has to be recouped from customers
through higher charges. This is precisely
the conclusion reached in the Chartered
Accountants’ report62
If it also the case that the poorer and less
well-connected one’s customers are, the
greater the expense of carrying out all the
necessary investigations of their back-
grounds and purposes will be, it follows
that those with fewest resources will have
the greatest difficulty in gaining acceptance
as clients, and the higher the transaction
costs to which they will consequently find
themselves exposed. In these circumstances
the competitive advantages of IVTS/
hawala networks will be yet further rein-
forced (always provided they can avoid
prosecution for regulatory offences) for all
but their most well-heeled and well-con-
nected potential clients. Nor will ever-
greater efforts to impose regulatory confor-
mity be likely to improve matters. Not
only are the courts likely to display an
increasing tendency to call the bluff of pro-
secutors, but the incentive to utilise the
facilities of informal networks will become
steadily greater, if only because of their
commercial efficiency; and if that results in
IVTS networks moving yet further under-
ground and/or offshore — and there are
good reasons to suggest that this has
already begun to occur — the forensic
objectives of the whole exercise will be yet
further undermined.
Last but not least it is also worth
remembering that the trust-based financial
transfers discussed in this paper are but the
tip of a very much larger iceberg. Since
the data to which the author has had direct
access are far more concerned with out-
ward value transfers from the UK than
with the counter-transfers to which the
resultant liquidity gives rise, the author has
only been able to sketch out the broad out-
lines of the financial and commercial activ-
ities in South and West Asia which the
resultant flows of liquidity support. More-
over, given that trust-based networks pro-
vide the foundations for a large proportion
of financial and commercial activity
throughout the non-European world —
and most especially in communities of Chi-
nese origin — the current scale of funds
flowing through IVTS networks of one
sort or another is undoubtedly dramatically
larger than any of those to which the
author referred in the introduction to this
paper. This is not evidence of global non-
European criminal conspiracy. Rather it
should be understood as the financial coun-
terpart of East and South Asia’s success in
undercutting the high costs of manufactur-
ing activity as currently organised in Euro-
American contexts. Cost-cutting in the
value-transfer market has been achieved by
just the same methods: by making intensive
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use of advanced technology, by organising
operations on a just-in-time basis, and by
cutting out redundant bureaucratic proce-
dures and the extensive use of distributed
systems — all pinned together by networks
of trust to hold the whole operation
together. The result is a product which is
frequently superior to, but invariably con-
siderable cheaper than, those that their
Euro-American rivals have so far been able
to construct. Given all this, the arguments
and perspectives which Franco Furger
advances in a paper presciently entitled
‘Global Markets, New Games, New Rules:
The Challenge of International Private
Governance’,63 are of much wider applic-
ability than is currently appreciated.
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